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Proposed Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965
Laughlin McDonald
 
Shelby County Invalidated the Section 5 Coverage
Formula
1  In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013), the Supreme Court, in a
closely  divided  5-4  decision,  held  the  coverage  formula  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act,
Section 4(b), 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b), was unconstitutional because it “is based on decades-
old data and eradicated practices.”1 The coverage formula, first enacted in 1965 and
extended  in  1970,  1975,  1982,  and  2006,  was  based  on  whether  a  state  or  political
subdivision used a “test or device” for voting and whether less than 50% of voting age
citizens were registered or voted in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential elections. 133
S.Ct. at 2619-20, 2627. The phrase “test or device” is defined as any requirement that “a
person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability
to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational
achievement  or  his  knowledge  of  any  particular  subject,  (3)  posses  good  moral
character,  or  (4)  prove  his  qualifications  by  the  voucher  of  registered  voters  or
members of any other class.” 52 U.S.C. § 10303(c). A ban on tests or devices was made
nationwide in 1970 by amendments to the Voting Rights Act and made permanent in
1975. 52 U.S.C. § 10501(a); Shelby County, 133 S.Ct. at 2620. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970), the Court held the nationwide ban on literacy tests imposed by the 1970
amendments was constitutional. 
2  When first enacted in 1965, the Voting Rights Act was “designed by Congress to banish
the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in
parts of our country.” South Carolina v.  Katzenbach,  383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). In 1975,
coverage  was  extended  to language  minorities,  defined  as  American  Indians,  Asian
Americans,  Alaskan  Natives,  and  those  of  Spanish  heritage.  52  U.S.C.  §  10503(e).
Congress  concluded  that  language  minorities,  like  racial  minorities,  had  been  the
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victims  of  significant  discrimination  in  many  areas,  including  access  to  voter
registration,  public  education,  housing,  administration  of  justice,  and  employment.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Voting Rights Act Extension, S. Rep. No. 295, 25, 29
(1975). 
3  Prior to the Shelby County decision, nine states and parts of seven others were covered
and were required by Section 5 of the Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10304, to get federal approval
(either  from  the  Attorney  General  or  the  Federal  District  Court  for  the  District  of
Columbia) of any changes in their voting practices or procedures before they could be
implemented.  133  S.Ct. at  2624.  The  covered  jurisdictions  were:  Alabama,  Alaska,
Arizona, California (five counties), Florida (five counties), Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan
(two towns), Mississippi, New Hampshire (ten towns), New York (three counties), North
Carolina  (40  counties),  South  Carolina,  South  Dakota  (two  counties),  Texas,  and
Virginia. Procedure for the Administration of Section 5, Code of Federal Regulations 28, pt.
51 app. (2002). The burden is upon the submitting jurisdiction to show that a proposed
change would not have the purpose or effect of diminishing the ability of racial  or
language minorities “to elect their preferred candidates of choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b).
A  voting  change  has  a  discriminatory  effect  under  Section  5  if  it  leads  to  a
“retrogression” in minority voting rights, that is, makes them worse off than under the
existing or “benchmark” practice. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
4  The majority opinion of the Court in Shelby County conceded “voting discrimination
still exists; no one doubts that.” 133 S.Ct. at 2619. It also held: “We issue no holding on
§5 itself,  only the coverage formula.  Congress  may draft  another formula based on
current  conditions.  .  .  .  and while  any racial  discrimination in  voting is  too much,
Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to
current conditions.” Id. at 2631. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg chided the
majority that “[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to
work  to  stop  discriminatory  changes  is  like  throwing  away  your  umbrella  in  a
rainstorm because you are not getting wet.” Id. at 2650. She also noted that the Voting
Rights Act contains a “bail out” provision, which allows a jurisdiction that has complied
with the Act for ten years and has engaged in efforts to eliminate intimidation and
harassment of voters to bailout from Section 5 coverage. According to Justice Ginsberg,
the bailout provision and it use by nearly 200 jurisdictions “exposes the inaccuracy of
the Court’s portrayal of the Act as static, unchanged since 1965.” Id. at 2644. 
 
Prior Challenges to Section 5
5  When enacted in  1965,  the constitutionality  of  Section 5  was  challenged by South
Carolina and five other covered Southern states. The Supreme Court held the statute
was constitutional because it was justified by the “insidious and pervasive evil which
had  been  perpetuated  in  certain  parts  of  our  country  through  unremitting  and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. The
Court also held the Section 4(b) coverage formula was constitutional because it was
designed “to describe these areas . . . relevant to the problem of voting discrimination.”
Id.  at 329. Congress was “entitled to infer a significant danger of the evil in the few
remaining States and political subdivisions covered by § 4(b) of the Act. No more was
required to justify the application to these areas of Congress’ express powers under the
Fifteenth Amendment.” Id. 
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6  Section 5  was  extended for  an  additional  five  years  in  1970,  and the  Section 4(b)
coverage formula was expanded to include the 1968 presidential election. Pub. L. No.
91-285, 84 Stat 314, 315 (1970). The extension was upheld in Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 535 (1973), in which the Court held “for the reasons stated at length in South
Carolina  v.  Katzenbach .  .  .  we  reaffirm  that  the  Act  is  a  permissible  exercise  of
congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.” Id. at 535. 
7  Congress again extended Section 5 in 1975 for seven years, and expanded the Section
4(b) coverage formula to include the 1972 presidential election. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89
Stat  400,  401 (1975).  City  of  Rome v.  United  States,  446 U.S.  156,  182 (1980),  held the
extension  was  “plainly  a  constitutional  method  of  enforcing  the  Fifteenth
Amendment.”  In doing so,  it  relied upon Congress’  conclusions that  Section 5  “has
become widely recognized as a means of promoting and preserving minority political
gains in covered jurisdictions,” that “recent objections entered by the Attorney General
. . . to Section 5 submissions clearly bespeak the continuing need for this preclearance
mechanism,” and that Section 5 “serves to insure that that progress not be destroyed
through new procedures and techniques.” Id. at 181. 
8  In 1982, Congress again extended Section 5, this time for 25 years and retained the
preexisting Section 4(b) coverage formula. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.131 (1982). The
constitutionality of the extension was affirmed in Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266,
282 (1999), which held “we have specifically upheld the constitutionality of § 5 of the
Act against a challenge that this provision usurps powers reserved to the States.”
9  In 2005 and 2006, Congress considered the need for continuation of Section 5 and the
appropriateness of the Section 4(b) coverage formula. It held 21 hearings, heard from
more than 90 witnesses, and compiled a massive record of more than 15,000 pages of
evidence. H.R. Rep.
10 No. 109-478, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (May 22, 2006); S. Rep. No. 109-295, 109 th Cong.,
2d  Sess.,  at  2  (July  26,  2006).  The House  Committee  on the  Judiciary  described the
record it compiled as “one of the most extensive legislative records in the Committee
on the Judiciary’s history.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 5 (2006). At the conclusion of its
deliberations Congress, by a vote of 390 to 33 in the House and by a unanimous vote in
the  Senate,  extended  Section  5  under  the  Section  4(b)  coverage  formula  for  an
additional  25  years.  152  Cong.  Rec.  S8012  (daily  ed.  July  20,  2006);  152  Cong.  Rec.
H5143-5207 (daily ed. July 13, 2006); Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King  Voting  Rights  Act  Reauthorization  and  Amendments  Act  of  2006,  Public  Law
109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). In doing so, Congress invoked its enforcement authority
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 90 (2006).
Both Amendments provide: “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.” 
11  Congress  also  amended  Section  5  to  restore  the  longstanding  interpretation  and
application of Section 5 which had been abrogated by Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528
U.S. 320 (2000) (“Bossier II”), and Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). In Bossier II the
Court held for the first time that the “purpose” prong of Section 5 prohibited only
voting changes that were enacted with a discriminatory and a retrogressive purpose.
528 U.S. at 328. In 2006, Congress explained that Bossier II’s limitation of the purpose
prong  was  inconsistent  with  Congress’s  intent  that  Section  5  prevents  “[v]oting
changes  that  ‘purposefully’  keep  minority  groups  ‘in  their  place,’”  as  well  as
purposefully retrogressive voting changes. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 68 (2006). See S.
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Rep. No. 109-295, at 16 (2006) (Bossier II gives “approval to practices that violate the
Constitution”).  Congress  thus  restored  the  pre-Bossier  II definition  of  the  purpose
standard to include “any discriminatory purpose.” 52 U.S.C. § 10304(c). 
12  In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court also changed the preexisting standard for determining
whether a voting change had a prohibited retrogressive effect under Section 5. Prior to
Ashcroft, the effect standard was “‘whether the ability of minority groups to participate
in the political process and to elect their candidates to office is . . . diminished . . . by
the change affecting voting.’” Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 94-196, at 60). In Ashcroft,  the Court approved a “totality of circumstances”
analysis  that  included  whether  a  minority  group  could  “influence  the  election  of
candidates  of  its  choice.”  539  U.S.  at  479.  Congress  concluded  the  new  standard
introduced  “substantial  uncertainty”  into  the  operation  of  Section  5,  which  was
designed to protect “the effectiveness of minority political participation.” H.R. Rep. No.
109-478,  at  70  (2006).  See  also id.,  at  68  &  70  (Ashcroft not  only  made  Section  5
“unadministerable” but “would encourage States . . . to turn black and other minority
voters  into  second  class  voters”);  S.  Rep.  No.  109-295,  at  18  (2006)  (“the  Georgia
standard is unworkable. The concept of ‘influence’ is vague”). In order to restore the
“ability  to  elect”  standard  articulated  in  Beer,  Congress  added  the  language  that  a
voting  change  was  objectionable  under  Section  5  if  it  diminished  the  ability  of
minorities “to elect their preferred candidates of choice.” 52 U.S.C. §§ 10304(b) & (d).
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 70-1 (2006). 
13 Shortly  after  the  2006  amendment  and  extension  of  Section  5,  a  municipal  utility
district in Austin, Texas filed suit claiming it was entitled to bailout from Section 5
coverage, but if not Section 5 was unconstitutional. Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist.
No.  One  v.  Holder,  557  U.S.  193,  200-01  (2009).  The Court  concluded the district  was
entitled to bailout and it was thus unnecessary to reach the constitutional question. Id.
at 205. The Court, however, for the first time expressed concerns about the coverage
formula and whether its “disparate geographic coverage” was “sufficiently related” to
the problems it targeted. Id. at 203. 
14  In April 2010, Shelby County sought a declaration that Sections 5 and 4(b) were facially
unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 811
F.Supp. 2d 424 (D. D.C. 2011), and Shelby County appealed. The court of appeals in a 2-1
opinion affirmed. It noted that Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203, which declined to consider
the constitutionality of the 2006 extension of Section 5, held the extension “must be
justified  by  current  needs,”  and  that  “a  statute’s  disparate  geographic  coverage”
requires a showing that it “is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” Shelby
County, Ala. v. Holder,  679 F.3d 848, 858-59 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court of appeals then
applied the “congruence and proportionality standard” of City of Boerne v. Flores,  521
U.S.  507,  520,  530  (1997)  (in  the  exercise  of  Congressional  power  to  enforce  the
Fourteenth Amendment there must be a “congruence between the means used and the
ends  to  be  achieved,”  and  “[t]he  appropriateness  of  remedial  measures  must  be
considered in light of  the evil  presented"),  in affirming the constitutionality of  the
extension of Sections 5 and 4(b). 
15  The  court  of  appeals  stressed  that  “the  record  contains  numerous  ‘examples  of
modern’ instances of racial discrimination in voting” in the covered jurisdictions relied
upon by Congress in amending and extending the Act in 2006. Shelby County, 679 F.3d at
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865. That evidence included: (1) 626 objections by the Department of Justice (DOJ) from
1982 to 2004 to voting changes that would have the purpose or effect of discriminating
against  minorities;  (2)  “more  information  requests”  from  DOJ  regarding Section  5
submissions which resulted in the withdrawal or modification of over 800 potentially
discriminatory  voting  changes;  (3)  105  successful  Section  5  enforcement  actions
brought  against  covered  jurisdictions  between  1982  and  2004;  (4)  25  preclearance
denials by the District Court for the District of Columbia between 1982 and 2004; (5) 653
successful lawsuits under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301, between
1982 and 2005 providing relief from discriminatory practices in at least 825 covered
counties; (6) tens of thousands of federal observers dispatched to monitor elections in
covered jurisdictions; (7) examples of “overt hostility to black voting power by those
who  control  the  electoral  process;”  (8)  racially  polarized  voting;  (9)  evidence  that
Section 5 has a strong deterrent effect; (10) litigation by DOJ to enforce the minority
language provision of the Act; and (11) Section 2 was an inadequate remedy for racial
discrimination in voting in the covered jurisdictions. Shelby County, 679 F.3d at 865-872;
120 Stat. 577, Sec. 2(b) . The court of appeals concluded: “After thoroughly scrutinizing
the record and given that overt racial discrimination persists in covered jurisdictions
notwithstanding  decades  of  section  5  preclearance,  we,  like  the  district  court,  are
satisfied that Congress’s judgment deserves judicial deference.” Shelby County, 679 F.3d
at 873; See 120 Stat. 577, Sec. 2(b) (summarizing the findings and evidence upon which
Congress relied in amending and extending the Voting Rights Act). The Supreme Court
limited  its  grant  of  certiorari  to  the  question  whether  “the  pre-existing  coverage
formula  of  Section  4(b)  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act”  is  constitutional.  Shelby  County,
Alabama v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 594 (2012). And in striking down the coverage formula, the
Court relied upon Northwest Austin in concluding the formula was not based on “current
conditions.” Shelby County, 133 S.Ct. at 2630-31. 
 
Examples of Current Voting Discrimination
16  There are many examples of current voting discrimination justifying the extension of
Section 5.  One involved Texas’s  2011 Congressional,  Senate,  and House redistricting
plans. In denying preclearance to the Congressional plan, the District of Columbia court
concluded  it  was  both  “retrogressive”  and  had  been  adopted  “with  discriminatory
intent.” Texas v. United States, 2012 WL 3671924 **14, 21 (D. D.C. Aug. 28, 2012). It based
its finding of discriminatory intent upon several factors, including: the removal of key
economic centers from the minority districts; the removal of district offices from the
minority districts  but  not  from any of  the districts  of  Anglo members of  Congress;
“Texas’s history of failures to comply with the VRA;” Black and Hispanic members of
Congress “were excluded completely from the process of drafting new plans, while the
preferences of Anglo members were frequently solicited and honored;” only 72 hours
notice was given of the sole public hearing on the proposed plan; failure to release a
redistricting  proposal  during  the  regular  session;  the  limited  time  for  review  of
proposed plans; and failure to provide election data to evaluate VRA compliance. Id. at
**20-1.
17  The  court  denied  preclearance  to  the  Senate  plan  because  it  “was  enacted  with
discriminatory purpose as to SD 10.” Id. at *26. That purpose was evident from a variety
of factors. The African American and Hispanic population in SD 10 was cracked into
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three other districts. Id. at *23. In addition, “every senator who represented an ability
district  was  excluded  from this  map-drawing  process  and  was  not  allowed  .  .  .  to
preview the maps.” Id. at * 24. “None of the senators representing ability districts were
shown their  districts  until  forty-eight  hours  before  the map was introduced in the
Senate.” Id at *24. At the staff level “no new proposals or amendments to the district
map would be entertained at the markup.” Id. at *25. The “legislature departed from
typical redistricting procedures and excluded minority voices from the process even as
minority senators protested that section 5 was being run roughshod.” Id. at *26. 
18  The court denied preclearance to the House plan because it abridged minority voting
rights in four ability districts - HDs 33, 35, 117, and 149 - and did not create any new
ability districts to offset those losses. Id. at *26. Because it found the House plan had a
retrogressive effect,  the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the plan had
been  enacted  with  a  discriminatory  purpose.  However,  it  concluded  that  “record
evidence may support a finding of discriminatory purpose in enacting the State House
Plan.” Id. at *37. The evidence of discriminatory purpose included: the House plan paid
little attention to the VRA; despite the dramatic growth in minority population “Texas
failed to create any new minority ability districts among 150 relatively small House
districts;” the evidence showed “a deliberate, race-conscious method to manipulate not
simply the Democratic vote but, more specifically, the Hispanic vote; and “mapdrawers
cracked VTDs (Voting Tabulation District) along racial lines to dilute minority voting
power.” Id. at **36-7.
19  As is apparent, during its 2011 redistricting process the State of Texas resorted to overt
racial discrimination in minimizing the opportunities of minorities to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. It undeniably underscores
the continuing need for Section 5 and redrafting the coverage formula.
20  Another example of current voting discrimination involved South Carolina. In 2011 the
state enacted a new photo ID requirement for in-person voting, and submitted it to DOJ
for preclearance under Section 5. On December 23, 2011, DOJ objected to the change on
the grounds that it would have a discriminatory effect upon minority voters. See Letter
from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, to C. Havird Jones, Jr., S.C. Assistant
Deputy Attorney General, December 23, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/
sec/_5/obj_activ.php. The DOJ noted that the “absolute number of minority citizens
whose  exercise  of  the  franchise  could  be  adversely  affected  by  the  proposed
requirements runs into the tens of thousands.” Id. at p. 3. South Carolina then filed an
action for judicial  preclearance of the photo ID requirement. The experts for South
Carolina  and  the  defendants  agreed  that  as  of  April  2012,  some 130,000  registered
voters in the state lacked a photo ID acceptable under the new law, and those voters
were disproportionately likely  to  be members of  a  racial  minority.  South Carolina  v.
Holder,  2012  WL  4814094  *20  (D.  D.C.  Oct.  10,  2012).  The  three-judge  court  denied
preclearance  of  the  photo  ID  requirement  for  the  November  2012  election because
there  was  not  adequate  time to  implement  it  to  ensure  the  law would  not  have  a
discriminatory effect on African American voters. However, it granted preclearance for
subsequent  elections  but  only  because  the  state  ultimately  agreed  during  the
protracted  course  of  the  litigation  that  the  law  “allows  citizens  with  non-photo
registration cards to still vote without a photo ID so long as they state the reason for
not having obtained one.’’ Id. at *1. In a concurring opinion, Judge Bates underscored
“the vital function that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has played here. Without the
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review  process  under  the  Voting  Rights  Act,  South  Carolina’s  voter  photo  ID  law
certainly would have been more restrictive.” Id. at *21. The state’s agreement to modify
the ID law was driven by “South Carolina officials’ efforts to satisfy the requirements of
the Voting Rights Act.” Id. As Judge Bates concluded: “The Section 5 process here . . .
demonstrates the continuing utility of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in deterring
problematic,  and hence encouraging non-discriminatory,  changes in  state  and local
voting laws.” Id. at  *22.  South Carolina’s  continuing efforts to marginalize minority
voting strength further underscores the need for Section 5 preclearance, and the need
for Congress to enact a new coverage formula. 
21  South Carolina and Texas are not isolated examples. In the 2014 elections, the first
held in nearly fifty years without the full protection of the Voting Rights Act, voters in
fourteen states faced new restrictions at the polls. See, Ari Berman, Give Us The Ballot;
The Modern Struggle For Voting Rights In America (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York;
2015),  p. 311.  These  restrictions  included  cut  backs  in  early  voting,  photo  ID
requirements for in-person voting, abolishing same day registration and voting, not
counting ballots cast in the wrong precincts, and making it harder to register to vote.
To  cite  another  recent  example,  San Juan County,  Utah,  the home of  a  substantial
Navajo Indian population, implemented a new system of mail-in voting in 2015. The
change will have a significant adverse impact on the ability of Navajo Indians to vote
because many lack adequate access to public mails. And Alabama also announced in
2015 that it was closing 31 of its 67 motor vehicle locations, the majority of which are in
counties with substantial black populations. These closures will make it more difficult
for blacks applying for driver’s licenses to also register to vote. Had Section 5 been in
effect, these changes would have been required to be precleared. 
 
Pending Bills
22  Following lengthy discussions,  a coalition of civil  rights organization, voting rights
attorneys,  voting rights  advocates,  and a  bipartisan group of  members  of  Congress
reached an agreement on the provisions of a new bill to respond to the decision in
Shelby County. A bipartisan bill designed to move quickly through Congress following
the decision was first introduced in 2014 and reintroduced in 2015, the Voting Rights
Amendment Act (H.R. 885) (VRAA). It covered only four states and did not have support
from some members of Congress who were opposed to any revision of the coverage
formula. Another bill has been introduced, known as the Voting Rights Advancement
Act of 2015 (S. 1659/H.R. 2867(Advancement Act), designed to strengthen the VRAA of
2014.  The  Advancement  Act  contains  three  separate  preclearance  provisions:  (1)  a
geographic  coverage  formula  with  three  standards,  Section  4;  (2)  a  preclearance
requirement for the most suspect voting changes, Section 5; and (3) an expansion of the
existing bail-in provision to include violations of any Federal voting rights laws, Section
3.
23  Under the geographic coverage formula, any state that has had either (1) 15 voting
rights violations in the most recent 25-year period or (2) 10 violations, one of which
was  statewide,  on  the  most  recent  25-year  period,  would  be  subject  to  Section  5
preclearance  for  all  of  its  voting  changes,  including  those  at  the  state  and  local
jurisdictional level, for 10 years starting on January 1 of the year of the most recent
voting rights violation. This is a dual statewide coverage formula and would subject 13
Proposed Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965
Transatlantica, 1 | 2015
7
states to coverage: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. For those
states not covered pursuant to the above formulas, preclearance would be required of a
sub-jurisdiction  within  a  state  if  there  have  been  3  voting  rights  violations  in  the
jurisdiction in the most recent 25-year period. A sub-jurisdiction would be covered for
10 years starting on January 1 of the year of the most recent voting rights violation. 
24  For purposes of the coverage formula, a voting rights violation occurred in a state or
political  subdivision  if:  (1)  a  final  judgment  has  been  entered  finding  a  denial  or
abridgement of voting rights on account of race, color, or membership in a language
minority  in  violation  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  or  the  Fourteenth  or  Fifteenth
Amendments; (2) a consent decree or settlement agreement was entered resolving a
complaint alleging a denial or abridgement of voting rights on account of race, color, or
membership  in  a  language  minority  in  violation  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  or  the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments; (3) the Attorney General imposed an objection
under Section 5 to a proposed voting change or the District Court for the District of
Columbia denied preclearance to a proposed change. Once a state or local jurisdiction is
subject  to  preclearance  under  the  above  formulas,  it  remains  covered for  10  years
unless  the  state  of  subdivision  obtains  a  bail-out  under  the  existing  provisions  of
Section 4(a) of the VRA.
25  Under Section 6  of  the Advancement Act  reasonable public  notice in a  reasonably
convenient  and  accessibly  format  would  be  required  of  any  change  to:  (1)  voting
qualifications,  prerequisites,  standards,  practices,  or  procedures;  (2)  polling  place
resources; or (3) demographics and electoral districts. Notice should also be provided
for any change made in the 180 days prior to any election. The right to vote of any
person shall not be denied or abridged because the person failed to comply with any
change made by a state or political subdivision if the state or subdivision did not meet
the applicable requirements of this section with respect to the change. 
26  If any jurisdiction not covered by the geographic coverage formula makes one of the
following voting changes, that change would also have to be precleared before it could
be implemented: (1) changes to the method of election to add seats elected at-large or
to change one or more seats elected by single member seats, where: (i) two or more
language  minority  or  racial  groups  each  represent  20% or  more  of  the  voting  age
population (VAP) in the state or political subdivision; or (ii) a single language minority
group represents 20% or more of the VAP on an Indian reservation located in whole or
in part in a political subdivision; (2) reductions in the kind or type of voting materials
that are provided in a language other than English or changes to the manner in which
such  materials  are  provided  or  distributed  where  no  such  reduction  of  change  in
English language materials has occurred; (3) any change or series of changes within a
year  to  the  boundaries  of  a  jurisdiction that  reduces  by  three  or  more  percentage
points the proportion of the jurisdiction’s citizen voting age population (CVAP) that is
comprised of members of a single racial or language minority group in the jurisdiction,
and where: (i) two or more language minority or racial groups each represent 20% or
more of the VAP in the political subdivision; or (ii) a single language minority group
represents 20% or more of the VAP on an Indian reservation located in whole or in part
in a political subdivision; (4) changes to voter registration or verification requirements
that  create  additional  requirements  or  steps  in  the  process;  (5)  changes  to  the
boundaries of election districts through redistricting in jurisdictions where any racial
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or language minority group experiences a population increase of at least 10,000 or 20
percent of VAP over the preceding decade as measured by the five year estimate by the
U.S. Census American Community Survey; (6) any change that reduces, consolidates, or
relocates voting locations, including early, absentee, and election day voting locations
in: (i) one or more census tracts within the jurisdiction wherein two or more language
minority or racial groups each represent 20% or more of the VAP; or (ii)  an Indian
reservation wherein at  least  20% of  the VAP belongs to a  single  language minority
group. 
27  The  Advancement  Act  also  provides  that  the  Attorney  General  can  send  federal
observers  to  any  place  where  she  determines  there  is  a  substantial  risk  of  racial
discrimination at the polls on election day or during the early voting period. It also:
makes  explicit  that  tribal  governments  have  the  ability  to  request  federal  election
observers and  monitors;  ensures  that  ballots  are  translated  into  all  written  Native
languages  in  jurisdictions  with  obligations  under  Section  203  of  this  Act;  requires
annual consultation between DOJ and Tribal organizations to discuss voting issues; and
requires that jurisdictions offer substantially equal opportunities for voter registration
and voting on and off Indian Reservations.
28  The Advancement Act, Section 3, also expands the existing “bail-in” provision of the
Voting Rights Act. Under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c), a
court may subject a state or political subdivision to Section 5 coverage “for such period
as it may deem appropriate” if the court finds the state or political subdivision has
violated  the  Fourteenth  or  Fifteenth  Amendments.  The  bail-in  provision  was  not
affected by the Shelby County decision but remains in force. Two non-covered states,
Arkansas and New Mexico,  were subjected to partial  preclearance under the bail-in
provision,  as  well  as  jurisdictions  in  California,  Colorado,  Florida,  Nebraska,  New
Mexico, New York, South Dakota, and Tennessee. In Sanchez v. Anaya, C.A. No. 82-0067M
(D. N.M. Dec. 17, 1984), the court found New Mexico’s legislative plan violated Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, and required preclearance of state redistricting plans for a
period of ten years. In Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F.Supp. 585, E.D. Ark, 1990), appeal dismissed,
498 U.S. 1129 (1991), the court found the state had intentionally discriminated against
black voters by enacting a majority vote requirement and ordered the state to preclear
future laws establishing majority vote requirements and leaving the requirement in
place  until  “further  order  of  this  Court.”  740  F.Supp. at  627.  And  relying  upon  its
“inherent equitable power,” it also ordered Arkansas to preclear its 1990 redistricting
plan. Id. at 602. For a discussion of the coverage of the other jurisdictions, see Travis
Crum, “The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic
Preclearance,”  119 Yale  L.J. 1992,  (2010).  Violations  of  the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments can require proof of a discriminatory purpose. See City of Mobile, Ala. v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (action by a state “violates the Fifteenth Amendment only
if motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (a law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment  only  if  it  “can  be  traced  to  a  discriminatory  purpose”).  A  significant
exception  is  violations  of  the  one  person,  one  vote  standard  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment. They do not require a finding of discriminatory purpose but only that
voting  districts  are  of  substantially  unequal  size.  Reynolds  v.  Sims,  377  U.S.  533,
560-61(1964) (“The fundamental principle of representative government in this country
is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex,
economic status, or place of residence”). In view of the general requirement of proof of
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a discriminatory purpose to establish a constitutional violation, the bail-in provision
would  be  strengthened  and  made  more  effective  in  addressing  problems  of
discrimination in voting by providing that a jurisdiction could be subjected to Section 5
preclearance if a court finds a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments or
any  federal  voting  rights  law that  prohibits  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  race  or
membership in a language minority. That would include Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act which does not require proof of a discriminatory purpose. 
29  In amending and extending the Voting Rights Act in 1982, Congress made clear that a
violation  of  Section  2  “could  be  proved  by  showing  discriminatory  effect  alone.”
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). And see Chisom v. Roemer, 502 U.S. 380, 383-84
(1991)  (“In  1982,  Congress  amended 2  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  to  make  clear  that
certain practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the right to
vote are forbidden even though the absence of proof of discriminatory intent protects
them from constitutional challenge”). A violation of Section 2 can be established by
showing  that  racial  and  language  minorities  “have  less  opportunity  than  other
members  of  the  electorate  to  participate  in  the  political  process  and  to  elect
representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). And see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. at 36-51 (discussing the factors relevant to a Section 2 vote dilution challenge to
multi-member legislative districts). The constitutionality of Section 2 is not in doubt. As
the majority in Shelby  County held:  “Our decision in no way affects  the permanent,
nationwide ban on racial  discrimination in  voting found in  §  2.”  133  S.Ct.  at  2631.
Violations of minority voting rights under other provisions of federal law could also
trigger bail-in, such as Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10503 (providing
bilingual election requirements for language minorities). 
30  The  Advancement  Act,  Section  8,  also  provides  that  preliminary  injunctive  relief
applies  to  all  provisions  of  the  VRA  and  that  such  relief  shall  be  granted  if  the
complainant raises a “serious question” and that, on balance, granting relief will be less
of a hardship to the defendants than to the plaintiff if relief were not granted. The
proposed amendment would significantly strengthen Section 2.  As noted above,  the
majority  in  Shelby  County upheld  Section  2.  The  problem with  Section  2  is  that  its
enforcement  depends  on  suits  brought  by  the  victims  of  discrimination  or  the
Department of Justice. Not only do the plaintiffs have the burden of proof but Section 2
litigation can be time consuming, expensive and a challenged practice can remain in
effect until the termination of the litigation.
31  In extending Section 5 in 2006 Congress concluded the “failure to reauthorize the
temporary provisions, given the record established, would leave minority citizens with
the inadequate remedy of a Section 2 action.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 57 (2006). This
conclusion was based on extensive testimony that Section 2 litigation places the burden
of proof on the victims of discrimination rather than its perpetrators, imposes a heavy
financial  burden  on  minority  plaintiffs,  is  heavily  work-intensive,  cannot  prevent
enactment  of  discriminatory  voting  measures,  and  allows  discriminatorily  elected
officials  to  remain  in  effect  for  years  until  litigation  is  concluded.  See, e.g. ,  House
Hearing, History, Scope, and Purpose, vol. I, at 92, 97, 101 (2005) (testimony of Nina
Perales);  id.  at  79,  83-84  (testimony  of  Anita  Earls);  House  Hearing,  Evidence  of
Continued Need, vol. 1, at 97 (2006) (testimony of Joe Rogers). A Federal Judicial Center
study found that voting cases required nearly four times more work than the average
district court case and ranked as the fifth most work-intensive of the 63 types of cases
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analyzed. See Federal Judicial Center, 2003-2004 District Court Case Weighting Study,
Table 1, pp. 5-6. In Large v. Fremont County, Wyo., 709 F.Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Wyo. 2010), for
example, plaintiffs filed their Section 2 complaint in October 2005, but did not get a
decision on the merits until April 2010, some five years later. In Levy v. Lexington County,
South Carolina, 589 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 2009), the plaintiffs filed their Section 2 complaint
in September 2003, but did not get a decision on the merits until February 2009, which
was subsequently vacated and remanded for consideration of additional intervening
elections. In Katzenbach, the Court stressed that “Congress had found that case-by-case
litigation  was  inadequate  to  combat  widespread  and  persistent  discrimination  in
voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the
obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits.” 383 U.S. at 328; see also
id. at 313-15 (explaining why case-by-case litigation had “proved ineffective”). City of
Rome also found that: “Case-by-case adjudication had proved too ponderous a method
to remedy voting discrimination.” 446 U.S. at 174. Accord, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507,  526  (1997)  (Section  5  was  “deemed  necessary  given  the  ineffectiveness  of  the
existing voting rights laws, and the slow, costly character of case-by-case litigation”).
By providing that preliminary injunctive relief can be granted if the complainant raises
a serious question and granting relief will be less of a hardship to the defendant than to
the  plaintiff  if  relief  were  not  granted  significantly  strengthens  the  impact  and
effectiveness of Section 2. 
 
Conclusion
32 There  is  no  way to  predict  what  Congress  will  ultimately  do  in  response  to  Shelby
County,  but the pending bipartisan amendments to the Voting Rights Act would not
only address the voting discrimination the Supreme Court acknowledged still exists,
but would be based upon current conditions and not decades-old data and eradicated
practices. The restoration of Section 5 and the strengthening of the Voting Rights Act
are sorely needed and Congress should enact appropriate legislation as it is authorized
to do by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
NOTES
1. Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion in which he stated “I would find §5 of the Voting
Rights Act unconstitutional as well.” 133 S.Ct. at 2631. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. 
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